Local Taxation of Realty Income Not Pre-Empted by State Property Tax by Laughlin, Stanley K., Jr.
LOCAL TAXATION OF REALTY INCOME NOT
PRE-EMPTED BY STATE PROPERTY TAX
Benua v. City of Columbus,
78 Ohio L. Abs. 152, 152 N.E.2d 550 (1958)
Plaintiff sought a declaration that the Columbus city income tax1
was invalid as applied to rentals derived from certain properties situated
within that city. Plaintiff relied on the so-called "pre-emption" doctrine'
and the fact that the state of Ohio levies a general property tax.3 The
court held that local taxation of realty income is not pre-empted by state
property tax.
Simply stated, the doctrine is that the levying of a particular tax
by the state pre-empts that field of taxation and municipalities are thereby
precluded from levying the same or a similar tax.4 Three reasons have
been advanced by the Supreme Court of Ohio as the basis of this doctrine.
(1) It is analogous to the pre-emption doctrine which has been
attached to the commerce clause of the federal constitution.'
(2) Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution grants
municipalities ". . . powers of local self-government .. . as are not in
conflict with general laws."6
(3) The pre-emption is an implied exercise of the power to limit
municipal taxation granted to the General Assembly by Section 13,
Article XVIII7 and Section 6, Article XIII of the Ohio Constitution.
Recent cases have relied upon the last reason. In other words, in
applying the pre-emption doctrine the courts are looking for an implied
legislative intention to foreclose a particular field of taxation to the
municipalities.
It would seem quite clear that under the doctrine the cities could
not levy a tax on real property outside the auspices of the state general
property tax.9 The problem is to determine whether or not the pre-
emption extends to a tax on the rentals received from real property.
1 COLUMBUS, OHIO, ORDINANCE 1073-56 (1956).
2For a discussion of the development of the pre-emption doctrine see
Glander and Dewey, Municipal Taxation; A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine,
9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948).
3 OHIO REV. CODE § 5705 (1953).
4 Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
5' City of Cincinnati v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E.
806 (1925).
6 Ibid.
7 "Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes...."
See City of Cincinnati v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 5.
8
"The General Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities . ..
and restrict their power of taxation ... so as to prevent the abuse of such power."
See Firestone v. City of Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925).
O Supra note 3.
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The cases dealing with pre-emption are not numerous and few
rules have been formulated for determining its scope in any given case.
In Haefner v. City of Youngstown' ° a municipal tax on public utility
rates was declared invalid. The court pointed out that the state levied
a tax on the gross receipts of utilities" and specifically exempted the sales
of such utilities from the state sales tax.1" This, it was said, indicated
the intention of the General Assembly that the sales of utilities should
not be subject to taxes other than the gross receipts tax.
A similar argument was used by the court in Ohio Finance Co. v.
City of Toledo'" to invalidate a city income tax as applied to the net
income of a dealer in intangibles derived from the income yield of his
intangibles. The state of Ohio taxes the owner of intangibles at five
per cent of the their income yield.' 4 Dealers are exempted from this
tax.' 5 The shares of such a dealer are, however, taxed at five mills of
their fair value'" and it is provided that this latter tax shall be in lieu of
all other taxes on the dealer's intangible property.'1
What the court has done in these two cases is to extend the pre-
emption doctrine past the "same or similar" test. The court found in
both instances that the state indirectly taxed the event which the cities
attempted to tax and expressly exempted that event from some other
state tax. This, they said, as effectively pre-empted that tax field as
would the levying of the same tax by the state.
By applying the reasoning of the Haefner and the Ohio Finance
cases we may develop an argument for the plaintiff. Section 5701.06
(C) (1) of the Ohio Revised Code exempts interests in lands, and rents
derived therefrom, from the definition of investments for purposes of
the intangible property tax. This, it could be argued, is an expression of
legislative intent that there shall be no tax on the incidents of land
ownership other than the general property tax. This argument would
be in keeping with the idea of "taxed indirectly and expressly exempted
from another state tax" discussed in the preceding paragraph.
However, there is not unanimous approval for the expansion of
the pre-emption doctrine. In the Ohio Finance case, a three-judge dissent
10 Supra note 4.
1 3OHIo GEN. CODE § 5483 (1941) (now OHio REV. CODE § 5727.38 (1957)).
12 OHIo GEN. CODE § 5546-2 (1951) (now OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.02(E) (2)
(1955)).
13 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955).
14 OHio GEN. CODE §§ 5638, 5638-1 (1943) (now OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5707.04
(A) (1953), 5707.03 (A) (1956)).
1l OHIO GEN. CODE § 5366 (1933) (now OHio REv. CODE § 5711.01 (A)
(1953)).
16 OHio GEN. CODE § 5638-1 (1943) (now OHIO REV. CODE § 5707.03(E)
(1956)).
17 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 5409, 5414-3 (1931) (now OHIO REV. CODE § 5725.26
(1953)).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
argued that the dealer was not taxed on the income yield of his intangibles
and that the pre-emption doctrine should be more narrowly interpreted.
The lack of certainty which the doctrine has today puts a municipal
tax on unstable grounds until such time as every phase of it is validated
by adjudication. This state of affairs promotes litigation and often a city
which had hoped to obtain a new revenue source finds itself instead with
the added expense of implementing to no avail and unsuccessfully
defending an invalid tax.
Governments today require sizable amounts of revenue but the
burden of providing that revenue must not be unfairly heavy upon any
class of individuals. In applying the doctrine the courts are attempting
to balance these considerations. But they must balance them with a
more or less mechanical formula which precludes a more comprehensive
inquiry into whether or not the tax burden is being fairly distributed.
The aforementioned constitutional provisions ' give the power to
limit municipal taxation to the General Assembly, not the courts; and in
keeping with the spirit of home rule it could be argued that municipal
taxes should be upheld in the absence of a clear legislative mandate to
the contrary.
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.
IS See notes 7, 8 supra.
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